Judicialização da política e ativismo judicial eleitoral: administração pública vs. jurisdição constitucional

Abstract

One of the main features of contemporary constitutionalism, understood as a development of the post–Second World War period, is the displacement of the central axis of tension from the Legislative and Executive branches toward Constitutional Jurisdiction. In this context, this paper seeks to examine to what extent constitutional jurisdiction may function as a mechanism for democratizing administrative activity in Brazil, without constituting an undue interference with the other branches of government. Starting from the premise that contemporary constitutionalism—grounded in the Democratic State of Law—is inherently linked to democratic ideals, the study argues that it holds the potential to promote meaningful transformations in state practices, particularly with regard to the control of actions and omissions of public administration. Thus, the paper contends that constitutional jurisdiction should be understood not only as an instrument of control, but also as a means of democratizing administrative activity, provided that it is exercised in accordance with democratic principles, in line with Lenio Streck’s Critical Hermeneutics of Law.