Superpoderes supérfluos do art. 23 da LC 64/90: as “provas robustas” no julgamento das candidaturas laranjas.*

Abstract

In the adjudication of fraud involving female candidacies, courts have shown reluctance to employ the superpowers conferred by Article 23. While legal scholarship often warns that this provision may result in judicial overreach, judicial practice demonstrates the opposite, particularly in mandate revocation proceedings arising from so‑called “sham” (laranja) candidacies. The assessment of such fraud typically demands robust evidence, frequently requiring proof of subjective intent, the demonstration of which is often impracticable. We therefore argue for the application of Article 23 to electoral proceedings tout court as a rational pathway toward legally legitimate outcomes, grounded in a shared body of concrete and historical experience. Such an approach does not entail a return to dangerous judicial overreach that threatens democratic values, nor does it relegate the provision to a superfluous role within the legal system.